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Abstract 
We employ the stochastic frontier methodology and estimate alternative profit 
efficiency in the banking industry of four new European Union Member States, 
namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic, over the 
period 1999-2003. Our results show that structural reforms in the banking industry 
improve performance in terms of higher efficiency, whereas the institutional 
development of the non-bank financial sector hinders banks’ profit efficiency.  
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1.  Introduction 
Restructuring the financial systems in Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) to meet the requirements of a market economy has proved to be a unique 
challenge. The accession of these countries to the European Union poses additional 
challenges, especially in terms of accelerating reform efforts towards financial 
integration. Throughout the transition and the accession path to the EU, strengthening 
financial markets and, in particular, improving the supervision and the regulation of 
the banking industry received a strong emphasis in those countries that aimed to cope 
with market forces and to achieve financial stability. The banking industry has, 
undoubtedly, played a key role in this process and has been at the forefront of reform 
efforts.  
The process of restructuring the banking industry neither has been an easy 
task, nor can be considered as being completed. This process primarily had to 
establish a basic level of operation in the banking system, which was rather a 
painstaking exercise, as it involved, apart from setting the appropriate legal 
framework, the transformation of the centrally planned economy into a market based 
economy. Although most CEE economies faced similar difficulties during this 
transition period, the progress through the years and across countries, regarding the 
process of privatization and recapitalization, the restructuring of financial markets, the 
degree of openness to foreign banks, as well as the management of bad debt problems, 
are quite diverged. Despite these differences, all Central and Eastern European 
countries have made enormous progress in reforming their banking systems. 
In recent years and due to this ongoing reform process the examination of cost 
and/or profit efficiency of banks in transition countries and especially in Central and 
Eastern European countries has received much attention. In particular, the issue of 
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examining the underlying determinants of banks’ efficiency is quite crucial, especially 
for the transition countries given that the enhancement of efficiency would assist their 
financial expansion and their ongoing process of real convergence within EU. Most 
studies in the literature, given the state dominance of the banking industry in the past, 
focus primarily on the relationship between bank ownership and performance (see 
Bonin et al. (2005), Hasan and Marton (2003), Rossi et al. (2004)). Although 
important as they are the financial reforms, and especially the ones referring to the 
liberalisation and the privatisation of the industry, few studies have actually examined 
the aggregate impact of these reforms on banks’ efficiency. To our knowledge only 
Fries and Taci (2005) examined the relationship between reforms in the banking 
sector and cost efficiency using the Stochastic Frontier Approach, while Grigorian 
and Manole (2002) used the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to investigate a 
similar relationship.   
This paper fills a gap in the literature by departing from the analysis of 
Grigorian and Manole (2002), as it uses a parametric approach to estimate banking 
efficiency. Also, in light of the increasing pressure on banks’ profitability for those 
countries due to intensified competition of the enlarged and integrated EU financial 
markets, an analysis of the impact of structural reforms in banking on banks’ profit 
efficiency seems of particular importance. To this purpose, our paper follows a 
different methodology than  the one proposed by Fries and Taci (2005) as it provides 
a more flexible theoretical form in terms of an alternative profit function, which 
incorporates an underlying optimisation that a typical bank faces. In addition, another 
open issue, which has not been dealt in the literature, is whether non-banking reforms 
have an impact on the banks’ profit efficiency of CEE countries. 
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In this paper, we address the above issues by employing the stochastic frontier 
approach, as developed by Aigner et al. (1977), to estimate banks’ efficiency. In 
particular, we estimate alternative profit efficiency and investigate its relationship 
with both financial banking and non-banking reforms. Our focus is on four Central 
European countries that have joined the EU since May 2004, namely the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic, which are considered to be part 
of the most advanced group of transition economies, and are featured among the 
earliest and swiftest economic and banking reformers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
overview of financial reform process in the four countries, while section 3 presents 
our methodology. Our dataset and the empirical results are presented in sections 4 and 
5, respectively, whilst some conclusions are offered in section 6. 
 
2. Financial Sector Reform - the EBRD Index 
The reform process of the financial sector from a centrally planned to a market 
based economy has raised many controversies. Thus, it should come as no surprise 
that efforts to reform the financial sector along the principles of a market economy 
have met more resistance than other transition reforms (Wihlborg, 2004). In 
particular, the progress of financial sector development has been associated with 
specific reforms implement by all CEE countries, though at a different pace, such as 
privatization, recapitalization, absence of strong government guarantees of bail-outs, 
and the implementation of effective bankruptcy laws. 
One of the most severe difficulties that CEE countries had to deal with, was 
the burden of bad loans they inherited from the past regime. Recapitalisation of banks 
and work out of bad debts followed different patterns among countries. Strategies 
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ranged from repeated interventions to one off initiatives and from a complete reliance 
on “work-out bank” to strong attention to individual banks’ incentives to solve 
portfolio problems. All countries have managed to reduce the ratio of non-performing 
loans in their balance sheet and to improve the quality of their portfolios through 
recapitalization programmes. As we can see from table 1, the ratio of non-performing 
loans has declined significantly during the period 1999-2003 in all countries but 
Poland, where decreased asset quality reflects the impact of macroeconomic factors, 
including the overall slowdown of the Polish economy, the growth of unemployment, 
and structural problems in certain industries currently being restructured. 
(Insert table 1 about here) 
Despite the problems experienced in the early years of transition, the CEE 
governments appeared determined to develop competitive and efficient financial 
systems based on market forces. Thus, they initiated large-scale privatization 
programs that substantially diminished the state ownership in banking during the late 
1990s. The main motive behind privatization of state-owned banks was the desire to 
enhance competition and efficiency in the banking sector through increased foreign 
and domestic participation. Indeed, by increasing competition, foreign ownership led 
to a remarkable improvement in services and to a compression of the spreads between 
deposit and lending rates, while it has also helped to improve the monetary 
transmission process. 
Banking crises that affected the region during this period have basically 
accelerated the privatization process. The decline in state ownership of banks is 
remarkable in all countries, as we can see from table 1. However, it is more profound 
in the case of Slovakia, where state-ownership was reduced from about 50% in 1999 
to 1.5 percent in 2003, and in the Czech Republic, where the ratio declined from about 
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41% in 1999 to 3% in 2003. The assets share of state-owned banks in Hungary has 
changed very little since 1999, due to the fact that Hungarian banks were almost fully 
privatized in the mid-1990s. By the end of 2003, the average share of state-owned 
banks was below 8% in all countries, but Poland, where the state still has direct or 
indirect control on about 25.7 percent of total banking assets.  
Another measure of financial development is the ratio of credit to the private 
sector as a percentage of GDP. Even after one decade of transition and successful 
bank restructuring, the level of financial intermediation in CEE countries remains 
stunted. This is reflected in a low penetration banking assets in the economy. 
Although banks are by far the most important pillar in the financial sectors of 
accession countries, the degree of financial penetration through assets and loans is 
much lower than in other emerging markets and the euro area. Several factors account 
for the low level of credit in all CEE-4 countries. First of all, the multinational 
companies, which dominate the economies of these countries, tend to borrow from 
their mother companies or from their banks abroad, bypassing the domestic banking 
system. Moreover, lending to households has been constrained by the low level of 
incomes, while the access to bank credit by domestic private firms has been impeded 
by the lack of sufficiently long track record that would make them acceptable credit 
risks for banks. As we can see from table 1, the most rapid expansion in bank credit to 
the private sector has taken place in Hungary. On the other hand, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia show a sharp decrease in credit. 
Finally, a general indicator of the progress in financial reforms is provided by 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EBRD indexes 
of banking and non-banking reforms provide a ranking of progress in liberalisation 
and institutional reform of the banking and non-banking sectors respectively, on a 
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scale of 1 to 41. A score of 1 represents little change from a socialist banking system 
apart from the separation of the central bank and commercial banks, while a score of 
4+ represents a level of reform that approximates the institutional standards and 
norms of an industrialised market economy, as represented, for example, by the Basle 
Committee’s Core Principles on Effective Banking Supervision and Regulation. 
As we can see from table 1, from the four countries under investigation, only 
Hungary has achieved the highest score of 4 for the banking reform index, while no 
country has achieved a score of 4 for the EBRD Index for non-banking reform. 
Hungary’s banking market has always been one of the most developed and liberal in 
Central and Eastern Europe mainly due to the early privatization of state-owned banks 
and the involvement of foreign investors, which has put the banking sector on a sound 
footing well above the other transition countries. Overall, in all countries, but Poland, 
reforms of the non-bank sector still lag behind those of the banking sector, which is 
not surprising given that banks dominate the financial system and have been at the 
centre of reforms, while capital markets have remained relatively underdeveloped. On 
the whole, we observe an increase in both EBRD indexes for the majority of the 
countries during the period 1999-2003.  
 
3.  A parametric methodological approach: the alternative profit function 
In light of this ongoing reform process it would be interesting to investigate 
whether these changes in the regulatory and financial environment have implications, 
among other things, for the efficiency of banking institutions. To this purpose, we 
employ the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) as developed by Aigner et al. (1977), 
to estimate profit efficiency. The SFA specifies a particular form for the profit 
                                                
1
 See the EBRD Transition Report (2004) for a detailed definition and classification. 
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function and allows for random errors. It assumes that these errors consist of 
inefficiencies, which follow an asymmetric distribution, usually a truncated or half-
normal distribution, and random errors that follow a symmetric distribution, usually 
the standard normal distribution. The reason for this particular structure of the 
composite error term is that, by definition, inefficiencies cannot be negative. Both the 
inefficiencies and random errors are assumed to be orthogonal to the input prices, 
outputs and country-level variables specified in the estimating equation. 
In particular, according to the SFA the estimation of banks’ relative efficiency 
using panel data is performed by estimating a profit function of the general form: 
cstcstcstcst uy −+Χ′+= εβα     (1) 
where ycst is total profit in logarithm form of bank s in country c in period t, cstX ′  is a 
matrix of outputs, input prices and explanatory variables in logarithm form, εcst is a 
random error term that follows a symmetric normal distribution (εs~idd N(0,σ 2ε )) and 
ucst > 0 is the technical inefficiency term that follows a half-normally distributed, 
(us~iid N+(µ,σ2u)).  
Regarding the definition of efficiency, we follow the approach of Pulley and 
Humphrey (1993) and Berger and Mester (1997) that allows estimating an alternative 
profit efficiency given that banks hold some degree of market power on output. This 
widely-used alternative profit approach departs from the restrictions imposed by 
assuming a perfectly competitive output markets. Thus, instead of counting deviations 
from optimal output as inefficiency, as in the standard profit function, variable output 
is held constant, while output prices are free to vary and affect profits. Hence, profits 
are a function of both input prices and output quantities, while the bank chooses input 
quantities and output prices.  
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As it is common practice in the efficiency literature, in this paper we employ 
the translog2 specification of the underlying profit function in (1), with the standard 
underlying symmetry and homogeneity assumptions, which takes the following form: 
∑∑∑∑∑∑ ++++=++
i j
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Total profit, pist, is defined as profit before tax of bank s at time t. Following 
the literature, we add a constant3, θ, to profit for all banks to avoid having negative net 
profits for any bank observation. Pi is a vector of input prices, Yi is a vector of 
variable outputs, Ni is a vector of fixed netputs, and T is a time trend capturing 
technological change over the period4. In order to retrieve the inefficiency component 
from the composite error for each bank from the alternative profit function estimation, 
the method of Jondrow et al. (1982) is employed to calculate the conditional 
expectation uist given vist=εist-uist.  
A variety of approaches have been proposed in the literature for the definition 
of bank inputs and outputs, i.e. the production, the intermediation, the asset, the value-
                                                
2
 We prefer the translog specification compared with the alternative Fourier-flexible functional form, 
since the latter application requires additional truncations of data (Hasan and Marton, 2003). Moreover, 
Berger and Mester (1997) report that mean efficiency estimates between the two procedures is very 
small. 
3
 θ indicates the absolute value of the minimum value of profit (pi) over all banks in the sample. 
4
 In equation (2) we impose linear homogeneity in prices,∑ =
i
i 1α , whilst symmetry restrictions in all 
quadratic terms are also imposed in accordance with economic theory, αij=αji; δij=δji; λij=λji; γij=γji.   
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added and the user-cost approach; yet, there is little agreement among economists, 
mainly as a result of the nature and functions of financial intermediaries (see Berger 
and Humphrey (1992) and Maggi and Rossi (2003)).  
 In this paper, we follow the intermediation approach and specify two outputs: 
loans, and other earning assets; and two inputs: labor and deposits. The price of 
deposits is computed by dividing total interest expenses by the total amount of 
deposits and short term funding, while the price of labor is defined as the ratio of 
personnel expenses to total assets. The dependent variable is defined as profit before 
tax. We also specify physical capital and equity as fixed netputs. The treatment of 
physical capital as a fixed input is relatively standard in efficiency estimation (Berger 
and Mester, 1997), while the level of equity is included so as to account for different 
risk preferences of banks and to control for bank’s insolvency risk (Hughes and 
Mester, 1993; Mester, 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997).  
The variations of inefficiency measures across banks may be associated with 
the banking and economic environment in which each bank operates. This is 
particularly relevant in the context of a cross-country comparison, as it is important to 
allow not only for variation in relative factor prices across countries but also for 
country-level variables that could influence the level of efficiency for all banks in the 
country and the quality of services provided by the banking sector. By ignoring 
factors in the economic environment that could influence technology efficiency and 
service quality variations, one would incorrectly assume that efficiency differences 
across countries are attributed entirely to managerial decisions within banks regarding 
the scale and mix of inputs and outputs. Country-specific factors, such as the level of 
economic development, legal and regulatory frameworks, household wealth and 
incomes and market structures in banking, can have significant effects on the level of 
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technological efficiency and service quality, and these effects are potentially 
important in the case of countries in transition.  
To examine the potential factors that are correlated with bank inefficiencies, 
we use the conditional mean model of Battese and Coelli (1993, 1995), which permits 
the simultaneous estimation of the alternative profit function and the identification of 
the correlates of bank inefficiencies in a single-step estimation. Thus, the estimation 
procedure allows for bank inefficiencies to have a half-normal distribution that is 
independently but not identically distributed over different banks. The mean of the 
inefficiency term is then modelled as a linear function of a set of explanatory 
variables. As in Battese and Coelli (1995), the mean profit-inefficiency (mpii) is a 
deterministic function of ρ explanatory variables, in other words: 
mpiist = zist ξ,      (3) 
where ξ is a ρx1 vector of parameters to be estimated. Following Battese and Cora 
(1977) let σ2 = σε2 + σu2 and γ = σu2 /(σε2 + σu2). Then, the inefficiency, uist, can be 
formulated as: 
ististiist wZu += ξ                                                 (4)  
where wist is assumed to be truncated normally distributed, with zero mean and 
variance σ2u, ξ is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, and Z is a vector of country-
level factors.  
We incorporate in our analysis several environmental variables, including: the 
EBRD Index of banking reform, the EBRD Index of non-banking reform, the 
Herfindahl Index that captures the degree of concentration in the banking industry, the 
ratio of credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, which measures the level 
of financial intermediation in each country and can also be considered as an aggregate 
measure of banking development, the interest rate spread, which is a proxy for 
 12 
competition for banking services, and two macroeconomic indicators, that is the GDP 
per capita variable, which serves as a measure of economic activity, and the inflation 
rate. 
Among the explanatory variables, the EBRD Indexes of banking and non-
banking reform are of particular interest for our analysis, as the motivation behind this 
paper is to investigate the relationship between profit efficiency and the banking and 
financial reforms implemented in Central and Eastern European countries, prior to 
their accession to the EU. 
 
4. Data sources and summary statistics 
Our data comprise of banks in four new European Union Member States in the 
area of Central and Eastern Europe, namely Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, that are listed in the IBCA-Bankscope database for the period 1999 to 2003. 
This database reports published financial statements from financial institutions 
worldwide, homogenized into a global format, which are comparable across countries 
and therefore suitable for a cross-country study5. After reviewing the data for 
reporting errors and other inconsistencies, an unbalanced panel of 362 observations is 
used, that included a sample of 90 banks from the four Central and Eastern European 
countries. Our sample is quite extended and covers most important banks, as defined 
by their balance sheet aggregates. Table 2 presents the number of banks by year and 
country.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
                                                
5
 The underlying hypothesis of the Bankscope is that all countries suffer from the same survival bias. 
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The sources of the macroeconomic data and measures of banking reform for 
the countries are the EBRD’s Transition Reports and the World Development 
Indicator Statistics. 
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics for the dataset we use in our 
analysis. It reports sample means for the overall sample and by country (calculated for 
bank-year observations), for the dependent and explanatory variables. 
(Insert table 3 about here) 
Comparing the summary statistics across countries, we see significant 
variations regarding profits, inputs prices and outputs. The mean of return on assets 
(ROA) is about 1.1% for all countries and ranges from 0.7 percent in the Czech 
Republic to 1.4 percent in Hungary. Taking outputs as percentages of assets, loans 
stand at about 46.3 percent for the whole region, ranging from 35.6 percent for the 
Czech Republic to 54.3 percent for Hungary, while the ratio of other earning assets to 
the balance sheet total stands at an average of 44.9 percent. Regarding input prices, 
the price of labour exhibits significantly more variability than the price of deposits 
across countries. Moreover, the ratio of equity to assets ranges between 9 percent in 
Hungary to 14.7 percent in Poland, while the ratio of physical capital to total assets 
exhibits much lower variability.  
Regarding the country-level factors, differences in average values of 
macroeconomic variables are significant, especially in the per capita GDP, which 
ranges from 4,018 in Slovakia to 5,676 in the Czech Republic. We also observe 
significant variation in the inflation rate, which ranges from 2.5 percent in the Czech 
Republic to 8 percent in Slovakia. The average interest rate spread is relatively high in 
Poland and Slovakia, while Hungary exhibits the highest ratio of domestic credit as a 
percentage of GDP. Regarding the structure of banking systems, average asset 
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concentration is relatively high in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, as it is indicated 
by the Herfindahl index. Finally, the banking sector reform progress as measured by 
the EBRD transition indicator stands at an average of 3.5 for CEE-4, while the EBRD 
index for non-banking sector reform is slightly lower and has an average value of 3.2. 
 
5. Evidence on the determinants of technical efficiency 
Next, we report the empirical findings of bank efficiency based on the 
Stochastic Frontier Approach. Table 4 presents the stochastic profit function 
estimates. The use of a common frontier has the advantage of allowing performance 
comparisons of banks across countries, while inclusion of country-specific variables 
allows us to control for differences in the environmental conditions in each country, 
which may affect efficiency. Most output and input price coefficients are significant, 
while they have the expected from the theory of optimisation signs. 
(Insert table 4 about here) 
Graph 1 presents alternative profit efficiency scores for each country. Overall, 
the results report substantial levels of inefficiency in the banking industry, suggesting 
that banks do not operate close to the efficient frontier. In particular, we can observe 
an average profit efficiency score of 0.56 for the whole period and for all countries 
under investigation, indicating that the average bank in the sample could increase its 
profits by 44 per cent to meet the performance of the best-practice bank. The observed 
high level of profit inefficiency is justified by the fairly low intermediation depth, 
while the observed high demand for financial services asserts additional pressure on 
banks. Given the potential reward of expanding market shares in a rapidly growing 
market, banks have little incentive to maximize profits by means of full utilization of 
their discretionary pricing power (Rossi et al., 2004). In addition, as interest margins 
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in these banking systems are relatively high, though declining in recent years, and 
banks earn substantial profits, they face less pressure to further increase profitability, 
thus shifting their attention to expanding their market share. However, efficiency is 
increasing over time for all countries (except for the Slovak Republic). 
A cursory look in the graph also reveals substantial differences in the 
efficiency scores across countries, a finding that highlights the challenges in terms of 
financial, and in particular banking, integration laying ahead for these new EU 
member states. 
(Insert graph 1 about here) 
Regarding the impact of reforms on efficiency, Table 4 shows that progress in 
banking reform, as measured by the EBRD transition indicator, is significantly 
associated with lower profit inefficiency, implying that efforts to restructure the 
banking industry has positively contributed to efficiency. This is consistent with the 
findings of Fries and Taci (2005), who also found a positive (though non-linear) 
relationship between reform and cost efficiency.     
 An interesting finding is that progress in non-banking reform, as measured by 
the EBRD non-banking transition indicator, is associated with higher profit 
inefficiency. This may be due to fact that as other segments of the financial market, 
and in particular capital markets, develop further and mature, the prominent role of 
banks decreases, and therefore the non-banking sector gains importance in the 
financial industry. For example, an opportunity to raise funds on the stock market 
would reduce the demand for bank loans by the best borrowers on the market 
(Grigorian and Manole, 2002). Less credit extended to these clients would then lead to 
lower returns with the final outcome being lower profit efficiency for banking 
operations. 
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 Finally, regarding the macroeconomic variables, the interest rate spread is 
negatively associated with profit inefficiency, reflecting the fact that higher spreads as 
associated with higher margins and thus higher profits. On the other hand, neither the 
Herfindahl Index, which measures concentration, nor the ratio of credit to the private 
sector as a percentage of GDP, has a significant impact on profit inefficiency. Also, 
there exist a negative and significant relationship between the level of economic 
development, as measured by GDP per capita, and profit inefficiency, implying that 
banks in higher per capita income countries are more efficient in terms of generating 
stronger cash flows and higher profits than banks in low income countries. This 
should not be surprising as countries with higher per capita income tend to generate 
more savings, and hence a higher demand for financial services. Our results are in 
accordance with Grigorian and Manole (2002). Concerning other elements of the 
macro environment, the inflation rate is found to be negatively correlated with profit 
inefficiency, suggesting that high inflation is not necessarily associated with large-
scale inefficiencies.    
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the impact of financial sector reforms on the efficiency 
of the banking systems in four Central European countries that have recently joined 
the EU, namely Czech Republic Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic, over the 
period prior to their accession to the EU, that is 1999 to 2003, a period characterised 
by intensive restructuring. 
Our findings, based on the stochastic alternative profit stochastic frontier, 
show a low level of profit efficiency that necessitates the continuation of restructuring 
in these countries so as to accelerate the process of financial integration. When 
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decomposing the efficiency scores by country, significant differences are reported, 
while a year-by-year analysis reveals an improvement in the efficiency scores over 
time. 
Regarding the importance of reforms in banking industry, they assert a 
positive impact on profit efficiency, implying that the restructuring of the banking 
sector has improved banks’ profitability. On the other hand, progress in non-banking 
reforms, as measured by the EBRD non-banking transition indicator, is found to be 
associated with lower profit efficiency. Finally, regarding the macroeconomic 
variables, we observe a negative relationship between profit inefficiency and both the 
level of economic development, as measured by GDP per capita, and the inflation 
rate. 
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Table 1: Financial Reform Indicators 
  
EBRD Index 
banking 
EBRD Index 
non-banking 
Domestic Credit to 
the private sector 
(% of GDP) 
Non-performing 
loans / Loans 
Asset share of state 
owned banks (in per 
cent) 
Country 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 
Czech Republic 3.3 3.7 3.0 3.0 39.4 17.9 24.5 5.0 41.2 3.0 
Hungary 4.0 4.0 3.3 3.7 25.8 42.3 4.4 3.8 7.8 7.4 
Poland 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 18.7 17.8 14.9 25.1 24.9 25.7 
Slovak 
Republic 2.7 3.3 2.3 2.7 39.1 25.0 32.9 9.1 50.7 1.5 
Source: EBRD Transition Report (2004) 
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Table 2: Number of banks in the sample 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Czech Republic 16 17 20 21 19 
Hungary 11 13 14 17 16 
Poland 25 26 26 29 28 
Slovak Republic 10 11 14 15 14 
CEE-4 62 67 74 82 77 
Source: Bankscope database 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Czech 
Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia CEE-4 
Total profits, outputs and input prices      
Ratio of total profit before tax to assets (in %) 0.7 1.4 1.3 0.8 1.1 
Ratio of total loans to assets (in %) 35.6 54.3 51.6 41.7 46.3 
Ratio of other earning assets to assets (in %) 56.6 36.5 39.0 49.7 44.9 
Price of deposits (in %) 6.0 6.5 7.2 5.5 6.4 
Price of labour (in %) 0.9 1.6 1.8 1.1 1.4 
Fixed netputs      
Ratio of equity to assets (in %) 11.2 9.0 14.7 9.2 11.2 
Ratio of fixed assets to assets (in %) 2.5 2.8 2.3 3.8 2.5 
Zs      
EBRD Index of banking reform 3.6 4.0 3.3 3.2 3.5 
EBRD Index of non-banking reform 3.0 3.6 3.6 2.4 3.2 
Domestic Credit (in % of GDP) 24.9 33.5 18.0 29.2 24.8 
Interest rate spread 4.3 3.2 5.5 4.7 4.6 
Herfindahl Index 1,904 1,371 1,166 1,796 1,507 
Inflation rate 2.5 7.5 5.0 8.0 5.4 
GDP per capita 5,676 4,878 4,461 4,018 4,777 
Source: Bankscope database 
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Table 4: Panel estimation of stochastic profit efficiency frontier and correlates of 
bank inefficiencies 
  Coefficient St. Err. P>|z| 
Ln(Y1) -0.334 0.238 0.160 
Ln(Y2) -0.140* 0.081 0.083 
Ln(P1) 1.354*** 0.382 0.000 
Ln(P2) -0.354 0.382 0.355 
Ln(Y12) 0.116 0.082 0.157 
Ln(Y22) 0.059** 0.024 0.013 
Ln(Y1)ln(Y2) -0.032 0.023 0.169 
Ln(P12) -0.070 0.056 0.218 
Ln(Y1)ln(P1) -0.096*** 0.031 0.002 
Ln(Y2)ln(P1) 0.044* 0.024 0.066 
Ln(EQ) -0.268*** 0.096 0.005 
Ln(PC) 0.587*** 0.194 0.002 
Ln(EQ2) -0.077*** 0.011 0.000 
Ln(PC2) -0.079*** 0.015 0.000 
Ln(EQ)ln(PC) 0.025 0.043 0.560 
Ln(EQ)ln(Y1) 0.076* 0.043 0.078 
Ln(EQ)ln(Y2) -0.009 0.029 0.753 
Ln(PC)ln(Y1) -0.078*** 0.026 0.003 
Ln(PC)ln(Y2) 0.014 0.024 0.563 
Ln(EQ)ln(P1) -0.095*** 0.032 0.003 
Ln(PC)ln(P1) 0.063*** 0.021 0.003 
lnT 0.346 0.594 0.560 
lnT2 1.099*** 0.125 0.000 
Ln(T)ln(P1) 0.083 0.081 0.304 
Ln(T)ln(Y1) -0.360*** 0.083 0.000 
Ln(T)ln(Y2) 0.035 0.036 0.332 
Ln(T)ln(EQ) 0.031 0.069 0.653 
Ln(T)ln(PC) 0.212*** 0.079 0.007 
constant 12.019*** 0.992 0.000 
Zs (Factors affecting inefficiency) 
EBRD banking -1.151*** 0.438 0.009 
EBRD non-banking 1.712*** 0.318 0.000 
HHI 0.411 0.734 0.575 
Credit/GDP -0.021 0.016 0.167 
GDP per capita -2.249*** 0.606 0.000 
Inflation -0.188* 0.111 0.091 
Interest spread -1.209** 0.500 0.016 
Number of obs        362   
Log likelihood -192.120 
  
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% significance level, ** indicates significance at the 5% significance level, * 
indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
 25 
Graph 1: Profit efficiency scores 
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